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ABSTRACT
C. HAKEEM SMITH, III: Europeanization and EU-ization
(Under the direction of Robert Jenkins)
The concept of Europeanization in Political Science literature has been used  to 
explain two separate processes; Europeanization and EU-ization.  Conflating 
Europeanization and EU-ization can be both incorrect and misleading.  By defining each 
process and identifying the separate mechanisms this paper seeks to encourage the use of 
EU-ization to study the process of European integration in the context of the European 
Union.  The concept of Europeanization is then the longitudinal processes occurring 
throughout Europe.
EU-ization is approached by identifying the mechanisms that affect states entering 
the European Union.  The states selected are Serbia and Croatia.  Europeanization is 
approached by identifying the mechanisms that affect European states both within and 
separate from the European Union.  The states selected here are Hungary, Croatia, Serbia, 
and Ukraine.  This paper concludes that Europeanization and EU-ization are distinct 
processes, and further research can benefit from approaches that study the separate 
dynamics.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
“What this continent has achieved is truly fantastic, from being a continent of war 
to becoming a continent of peace. In this process the European Union has figured 
most prominently.” (Jagland 2012).  
Any question about Europeanization requires a thorough understanding of the 
concept.  The study of Europeanization has followed the ebb and flow of European 
Integration, and as the EEC has transformed into the EU, throughout the subsequent 
enlargements, Europeanization has evolved from a simple explanation of the diffusion of 
norms and values throughout western Europe into a nebulous term both more complex 
and discrete than the current usage allows.  Only recently has the literature concerning 
Europeanization widened to include Candidate States.  Moreover, the focus of 
Europeanization continues to be between the interaction of the EU and Member States or 
Candidate States as either a top-down1 or bottom-up2 process.  This paper seeks to 
identify measurable mechanisms of Europeanization by first developing a workable 
definition that is distinguished from European Integration studies and the more EU-
centric usages; hereby designated as EU-ization.  In other words, a succinct definition of 
Europeanization is important in any empirical analysis of its effects.  
Following the definition of Europeanization, the separate process of EU-ization is 
1 Top-down refers to the EU as the supranational institution influencing national policies and practices 
and the domestic or national response.
2 Bottom-up refers to Member States influencing EU administration and governance by exporting 
preferences to the supranational level. 
identified and defined as a driving mechanism of European integration.  Moreover, 
because other scholars have argued that the challenge of explaining the political, social, 
and legal integration of the EU is one best solved by modeling not definitions (Olsen 
2002, p.943), this paper will also devise a model for identifying mechanisms of 
Europeanization and EU-ization.  The model discussed in a later section seeks to outline 
the dynamics of the interaction between Europeanization and EU-ization and to identify 
how European states interact with each other, with supranational and international 
institutions, and with members of those institutions.  The development of this model 
serves two purposes; first, it directly challenges Olsen's (2002) assumption that a 
definition of Europeanization is not analytically useful, and second it allows 
identification of possible mechanisms of Europeanization and EU-ization to be measured.
Finally, this essay will apply the models and definitions derived above to two 
distinct inquiries.  The first will identify mechanisms of Europeanization across four 
states: an EU member state, Hungary; an EU Candidate State, Serbia; a EU Candidate 
State with an accession agreement signed, Croatia; and a European non-member country, 
a state outside of the EU and the EU accession process; Ukraine.  These four states have 
been selected to highlight the mechanisms of Europeanization that affect different states 
along three particular various  points of a European Integration continuum.  The second 
will seek to identify the process of EU-ization in two EU Candidate States; specifically 
the Stabilization and Association Process.  The Stabilization and Association Process 
developed within a very short time into the mechanism by which the EU prepares the 
Balkan states for candidacy status.
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CHAPTER 2
CONCEPTUALIZING AND DEFINING EUROPEANIZATION AND EU-IZATION
The concept of Europeanization is applied in most of the literature to the 
European Union and its member states (Börzel 2002; Börzel and Risse 2000; Ladrech 
1994; Radaelli 2000).  Although there is a growing literature that has undertaken an 
analysis of Europeanization in regards to candidate states, the interaction studied is 
largely situated among a literature regarding the influence of the EU (Schimmelfennig 
and Sedelmeier 2004; Sedelmeier 2012; Vachudova 2005).  In other words, the majority 
of research concerning Europeanization is with a decidedly EU-centric perspective and 
focuses too narrowly on European Integration theory; what this paper terms as EU-
ization.  Even within this body of literature there are competing and conflicting 
definitions of Europeanization.  This section seeks to identify the relevant differences 
between Europeanization and European Integration and the distinction between an EU-
centric and a Euro-centric perspective.  In so doing, two distinct processes will emerge.  
The first process is Europeanization and is constantly interacting with European States.  
The second process is EU-ization and is concretely situated in time and space.
Of the various theories concerning European integration, social constructivism 
offers the most balanced and nuanced approach to understanding the development of 
Europeanization.  Social constructivism takes into account the rules, norms, identities, 
and cultures at an individual and international level.  Although there is no real unanimity 
among scholars about all that social constructivism implies, researchers can agree that 
social constructivism is decidedly geared toward interactions and the construction of 
reality as intrinsically connected to agents and vice versa (Omelicheva 2010, p.472).  By 
utilizing a social constructivist approach, any causal relationship concerning 
Europeanization and EU-ization can be disregarded, and the processes identified for the 
role played in constructing a European community.
The usage of the term Europeanization was developed from the German 
Europäisierung in the 1970s to denote historical European migration to and colonization 
of the Americas and has since been co-opted and misused by political scientists to 
identify western European integration up until the mid-1990s (Headley 2012).  Even 
among researchers the term was not used to describe a specific research area until the 
1990's, when it was then applied primarily to the EU's effects on Member States 
(Sedelmeier 2011, p.5).  With the hindsight of history and the understanding that the 
European Union has emerged from a deeper European integration project, the term 
Europeanization now suggests something broader than the Western European perspective 
that has conflated so many ideas into one concept (Flockhart 2012).  
The section below will detail some of the concepts of Europeanization in the 
current literature, outline how Europeanization has been misused to conflate two distinct 
processes, identify those researchers who have made a clear distinction between 
Europeanization and EU-ization, and develop from those scholars a set of definitions to 
use in analyzing European states.  The following section outlines the development of the 
working definitions of Europeanization and EU-ization in this paper.  Europeanization, in 
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the analytical framework of this essay, is the process of diffusing and internalizing norms, 
values, and beliefs over time and space throughout Europe states, including the EU, and 
European citizens.  EU-ization, retains the analytical focus on the EU and the transfer of 
rules, policies and practices between the supranational EU and Member States, candidate 
states (CS), potential candidate states (PC), and their actors.  
A number of scholars and researchers continue to make distinctions between 
Europeanization and EU-ization as separate and discretely occurring processes (Flockhart 
2010; Vachudova 2005; Wallace 2000).  As distinct as the two terms may be however, 
they are not mutually exclusive.  At this point in time, EU-ization in particular cannot be 
completely separated from Europeanization (Radaelli 2000).  
Ladrech (1994) approached Europeanization from a decidedly western European 
perspective; a posture adopted by many researchers in the mid-1990s.  Ladrech (1994) 
defined Europeanization as “an incremental process reorienting the direction and shape of 
politics to the degree that EC political and economic dynamics become part of the 
organizational logic of national politics and policy-making”(p. 69).  By focusing almost 
exclusively on the effect of the European Community (EC) on national institutions, 
Ladrech (1994) only hinted at the effect of national institutions and policies on the EC 
and other states.  Furthermore the analysis all but ignored the effect of norms, values, and 
beliefs at the individual, as opposed to organizational, level.  As will be shown in a later 
section, the mechanism of the process outlined above is associated with downloading.  
This top-down perspective permeated the research on Europeanization and  is part of the 
fundamental misapplication of the term.  By retaining a focus exclusively on the domestic 
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response of Member States to EU policy, the literature all but ignores the effect 
international organizations such as the Council of Europe, NATO, and the OSCE may 
have on Member States and non-member countries.  
Börzel (2002), reflecting a broader change in the literature away from focusing 
entirely on EC institutions, defined Europeanization in terms of the effects EU 
institutions and Member State domestic political structures have on each other, a 
“bottom-up” and a “top-down” dynamic.  By conceptualizing Europeanization as a 
process that works toward both Member States and the EU, Börzel (2002) outlines a 
dynamic and interactive multidimensional process.  Instead of simply one force acting 
“down” toward Member states, Europeanization could be opened “up” to include 
Member State policy preferences as well.  However, adding a new dimension continues 
to maintain the focus on the EU for Europeanization and, in particular, on policy 
preferences.  The mechanism of Member States preferences being transferred to the EU 
level will be identified, in a later section, as uploading.  
Radaelli (2000), capitalizing upon the deepening perspective of Europeanization, 
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Table 2.1: Use of Europeanization
Author Integrated Elements Identification in Literature
EC Policies
EU & MS Policies
EU & MS Policies, Practices, Norms
Wallace (2000)
Flockhart (2010) Europeanization and EU-ization
Ladrech (1994) EU-ization termed Europeanization
Börzel (2002) EU-ization termed Europeanization
Radaelli (2000) EU-ization termed Europeanization
EU, MS, & European Policies, Practices, 
Norms, Values
EU-ization termed Europeanization and 
Europeanization termed Globalization
EU, State, & European Policies, Practices, 
Norms, Values over time
broadened the process:
(A) construction (b) diffusion and (c) institutionalization of formal and informal 
rules, procedure, policy paradigms, styles, 'ways of doing things' and shared 
beliefs and norms which are first defined and consolidated in the making of EU 
decisions and then incorporated in the logic, domestic discourse, identities, 
political structures and public policies (p.4).
This conceptual leap into socially constructed identities contributed to allowing variables 
outside of policy and institutions to be attributed to Europeanization, such as norms 
values and beliefs concerning democracy, human rights, and rule of law.  Moreover, this 
understanding is central to utilizing a social constructivist perspective in studying 
mechanisms within the process of Europeanization, and the variable outcomes of those 
processes.  However, although Radaelli (2000) fails to disconnect the process from the 
EU, he does allow for the EU to affect non-member countries.  For example, the EU 
transport policy rules have been adopted by Norway and Switzerland, and the railway 
cross border connections with Ukraine and the Balkans could initiate similar policy 
changes as well.  However, there is no mention of any reciprocal process.  As will be 
discussed in a later section, the EU policy adaptations by non-member countries is a form 
of crossloading.     
Wallace (2000) argued that globalization and the development of the EU are two 
separate processes.  However, the distinction Wallace (2000) makes is between 
globalization and Europeanization with EU-ization implied although conflated in the 
definition.  By making a distinction between Europeanization and the EU, Wallace 
(2000) allows for the identification of two separate processes.  EU-ization therefore is the 
EU-centric process, primarily resulting from transfers of organizational and institutional 
7
practices and policies between the sui generis European Union polity and representatives 
of the Member States.  Europeanization therefore must be defined separately and is the 
interaction of European states with a broader European dimension, Europeans with each 
other, and includes norms, values, belief systems, and the construction of a European 
identity.  
What must be understood clearly, moreover, is that EU-ization does not exist 
without the prior process of Europeanization, and Europeanization, in its current iteration, 
should, in the case of EU Member States and Candidate States, include the process of 
EU-ization.  As Flockhart (2010) writes: 
EU-ization is the result of past structures of social power, identity 
constructions, norms and processes of social exclusion...Europeanization is 
an ongoing process across time and space, which has changed over time in 
response to different structural conditions and changing agent identities.  
Europeanization therefore is a continuously reconstituted phenomenon, 
which is constructed in the relationship between the European 'Self' and the 
non-European  'Other'.” ( p.793)
In short, Europeanization is much broader than is normally limited to the confines 
of the European Union and EU-ization.  Europeanization is the process of diffusing and 
internalizing norms, values, and beliefs over time and space throughout Europe states, 
including the EU, and European citizens.  In a later section a selection of European 
norms, values, and beliefs will be analyzed: democracy, human rights, and rule of law.  
EU-ization, on the other hand, is concerned primarily with the transfer of rules, policies 
and practices between the supranational EU and Member States, candidate states, and 
potential candidate states.  The rules and policies are primarily encapsulated within the 
acquis communautaire, but are incrementally changed over time; for example, 
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international trade agreements and common policies.  Moreover, EU-ization is a process 
that occurs within a certain time and space.  In other words,  EU-ization primarily 
involves transfers within the EU or directly interacting with the EU; especially those 
transfers that are predominantly regulatory and situated within the historical scope of 
states' accession to the EU. 
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CHAPTER 3
MODELING: A FRAMEWORK FOR EUROPEANIZATION AND EU-IZATION
This section develops a framework utilizing an novel integrated approach based 
on the research of Olsen (2002) and Wong (2011) as a method for identifying instances of 
Europeanization and EU-ization in selected European states.  This framework 
acknowledges that the two methodologies discussed developed based on an attempt to 
study EU policy-making.  However, the frameworks developed by Olsen (2002) and 
Wong (2011) fails to distinguish between Europeanization and EU-ization; this paper 
seeks to remedy what previously has been overlooked.  
Olsen (2002) identified a number of different phenomena to enumerate 
Europeanization.  There are five phenomena identified: changes in external boundaries, 
developing institutions at the European level, central penetration of national systems of 
governance, exporting forms of political organization, and a political unification project 
(Olsen 2002, pp.923-924).  Changes in external boundaries refers to the territory of the 
EU as a polity and the extent to which the European continent can be governed (Olsen 
2002, p.923); as has been termed in this paper, this phenomenon is an aspect of EU-
ization3.  Developing institutions at the European level is a direct result of legitimizing 
supranational authority and institutions (Olsen 2002, p.923); again an instance of EU-
ization.  Central penetration of national systems of governance is concerned with multi-
3 EU-ization here refers to the definition as established by this paper.  Olsen (2002) applied the 
phenomenon or “faces” discussed in this section to Europeanization.
level governance, and social and political harmonization (Olsen 2002, pp. 923-924); EU-
ization once more.  Exporting forms of political organization is the EU's policy toward 
non-member countries (Olsen 2002, p.924); in terms of this essay, a conflating of 
Europeanization4 and EU-ization.  Finally, as a political unification project 
Europeanization is conceptualized as the formative process of the EU as a polity; which 
can both include and/or exclude the previous four phenomena outright or in various 
stages (Olsen 2002, p.924); again referring to EU-ization.  
However, Olsen (2002) fails to identify Europeanization and EU-ization as 
distinct processes, and even goes as far as to suggest “questions of the properties, 
mechanisms and explanations of European transformations should not be turned into 
definitional issues...the challenge is to model the dynamics of change.” (p.944).  As 
pointed out in earlier sections, definitions of Europeanization and EU-ization are 
critically important especially when a framework attempts to measure and analyze those 
processes.  Furthermore, by establishing the phenomena based on institutional dynamics, 
Olsen (2002) leaves little room for developing mechanisms that interact at the individual 
level.
Wong (2011) likewise identifies five categories of Europeanization: national 
adaptation, national projection, identity reconstruction, modernization, and policy 
isomorphism (p.150-151).  However, Europeanization is presented in the context of EU 
Member States' foreign policy.  Therefore the framework is limited to institutions and the 
4 Europeanization here refers to the definition established in this paper and discussed in the previous 
section.
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conflates the processes of Europeanization and EU-ization as well.  
National adaptation focuses on a reactive process that occurs incrementally 
within the confines of the EU.  As a top-down process, national adaptation affects 
EU Member States by requiring an adherence to EU policies.   National adaptation 
is therefore an instance of downloading and is attributed to EU-ization.  The 
simplest iteration of downloading is the adoption of EU rules and regulations, 
acquis communautaire, for Candidate States seeking EU membership.
National projection, is a bottom-up process and the focus shifts to the EU 
Member States as national policies are exported to the EU level; again a clear 
mechanism of EU-ization.  National projection is therefore uploading and must be 
intrinsically connected to EU membership.  Environmental policy is an often cited 
example of uploading policy preferences to the EU level (Börzel 2002)
Wong's (2011) final three categories are identity reconstruction, 
modernization, and policy isomorphism.  In these three mechanisms the dialogue  
between supranational and national within the EU broadens to include non-member 
countries.  In identity reconstruction, or crossloading, policy-makers, powerful 
domestic actors, norm entrepreneurs, and citizens realign beliefs and identities to 
EU MS norms.  Researchers often analyze EU institutions and the reformulation of 
the identities of national actors and EU officials working together.  Elite 
socialization is often linked with identity reconstruction.  However, the focus 
remains on the EU and actors in EU institutions and how their interactions affect 
EU MS policies (Wong 2011).  Thus, when encapsulated within the EU 
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crossloading remains a mechanism of EU-ization.  Alternatively, when a broader 
European policy is reflected, non-member state actors' identities are affected, and 
European institutions are the focus, the mechanism belongs to the Europeanization 
process.  Rieker (2004) examined the neutrality of Sweden and Finland, and 
attributed changes in the national constitutions to the influence of the EU.  
Modernization is ostensibly concerned with the development and 
consolidation of liberal democracy and democratic institutions (Goetz 2001).  
Wong (2011) contextualizes modernization by the EU's effect on the policy and 
economics of prospective Member States through EU accession; EU-ization or 
downloading.  However, if applied to beliefs, values, norms, and identities of 
Europe, and applied to a non-member state, a country outside of the EU, 
modernization is clearly a mechanism of Europeanization.  In modernization, the 
focus of the individual or state is on Europe as a collective or an identity.  Agh 
(1999) for example, associated this process with democratization and membership 
in European institutions such as the OSCE and the Council of Europe.  Thus, 
modernization can be separated from the EU-ization process of downloading, and 
reconstituted, in the parlance of this paper, as the Europeanization process of 
frontloading.  Frontloading refers to the process of non-member states developing 
European norms, such as democracy and liberal values, despite any orientation 
toward to the EU.
Finally, when states adopt policies and norms which have proven successful 
for other European states, it is is called policy isomorphism and can occur in any 
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policy area, either directly through “regulation” or indirectly by “emulation” 
(Wong 2011, p.153).  Unfortunately this attempt to further qualify instances of 
policy isomorphism conflates Europeanization and EU-ization.  For the purposes of 
keeping the categories distinct, when policy isomorphism occurs as a direct result 
of EU regulation it is EU-ization (downloading) and when it is indirect it is through 
Europeanization; termed here as reloading.  Reloading is most often discussed in 
terms of emulation, and is the mechanism by which norms are diffused indirectly 
among Europe states.  As states and actors continue to interact in a European space, 
norms, beliefs, policies and values are constantly in flux at every level.  Thus, as 
states change to emulate change Europe preferences, they are doing so through 
reloading.  In fact, reloading, is such a dynamic process that one expects to find the 
most divergence among European states.  Reloading exists at all levels of analysis 
from the individual, to the state and to supranational institutions.  
In this context, downloading and uploading are fundamentally mechanisms 
of EU-ization.  These two mechanisms exist solely within the dynamic interaction 
between the EU, Member States, and states within the EU accession process; 
Candidate States and Potential Candidate States.  Crossloading occurs primarily 
14
Table 3.1: Mechanisms of Europeanization and EU-ization
Mechanism Emphasis Direction Process
Downloading EU Policy MS/CS EU-ization
Uploading MS Policy EU EU-ization
Crossloading MS Policy & EU Norms MS/CS/PC Europeanization/EU-ization
Frontloading European Norms European State Europeanization
Reloading European State Norms European State Europeanization
within the EU, but involves non-member countries as well, and represents 
conforming policies to a developing EU Member State standard.  Although 
crossloading is identified at the Member State level, the mechanism occurs within 
both EU-ization and Europeanization, and represents the nexus of these two 
distinct processes.  Often studies into the EU's influence of democracy promotion 
outline the impact of the EU on domestic structures and EU conditionality 
(Vachudova 2005).  In such cases the influence of the EU is relatively weak and 
contingent upon domestic actors and norm entrepreneurs to promote reform.  A 
“return to Europe” is usually the accompanying phrase.  For example, the 
“rhetorical action” that spurred the enlargement to Central and Eastern Europe in 
2004 was driven by EU member states (Schimmelfennig 2001).
 Frontloading removes the institutional structure of the EU.  The emphasis 
in frontloading is on the European community, and the influence of the European 
community on European states.  Finally, reloading emphasizes the state level.  In 
reloading the emphasis is on the interactions of self-identifying European states 
with one another, and in applying the norms, values, beliefs, and policies that seem 
to be successful in other European states.
By classifying instances of Europeanization separately from EU-ization, an 
analysis of the phenomena can be studied in states of varying categories: inside the 
EU, Member State (MS); in the accession process, Candidate State (CS); seeking to 
enter the accession process, Potential Candidate States (PC); and non-member 
states removed from the accession process altogether.
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CHAPTER 4
METHODOLOGY
As this paper argues, Europeanization and EU-ization are quite distinct processes 
that interact across multiple dimensions.  In order to operationalize these concepts two 
distinct approaches will be utilized.  This section will begin with the approach for 
Europeanization and finish with EU-ization.  
In order to measure Europeanization three variables will be identified and 
evaluated.  The variables are Democracy, Human Rights, and Rule of Law.  This 
variable represents the basic quality an ES should possess in order to be aligned with the 
current makeup of the European community.  The end of the Cold War and the 
subsequent democratization that followed through Central and Eastern Europe after 1989 
is indicative of this growing European quality; it is a trend toward liberal democracy.  As 
the foundation of acceptance to the process of Europeanization this variable is also 
reflective of the mechanism of frontloading identified in a separate section.
Democracy, Human Rights, and Rule of Law can be quite complex to identify 
and measure, and difficult to approach from other than a decidedly Western perspective.  
These variables will be measured using data gathered from Freedom House and the 
European Values Study.  Freedom House was chosen based on a data collection technique 
that employ a mix of sources: “foreign and domestic news reports, nongovernmental 
organization publication, think tank and academic analysis, and individual professional 
contacts” (Freedom House 2001).  Furthermore, the definition of democracy employed 
by Freedom House takes into account non-Western perspectives and the rating system 
evaluates the conditions in the countries analyzed rather than simply the governments and 
legislation therein.  The European Values Study was selected because the research project 
is comprehensive, including forty-seven European states, and longitudinal, from 1981 to 
2008.
The Freedom House survey includes ratings along two dimensions: political 
rights and civil liberties.  Political Rights includes the ability of people to freely engage 
in the political process and affect decision making at every level of government from 
running for office to policy-making.  Civil Liberties includes both the institutional 
element and the personal freedoms to develop, organize, hold, and express views outside 
of the state.  The Political Rights and Civil Liberties surveys are conducted separately and 
along two different checklists (see Appendix I).  The Political Rights checklist is used to 
answer questions concerning “the extent to which the system offers voters the 
opportunity to choose freely from among candidates, and to what extend the candidates 
are chosen independently of the state...the more people suffer under [autocratic] 
domination by unelected forces, the less chance the country has of receiving credit for 
self-determination” (Freedom House 2001).  The questions are scored, the totals 
tabulated, and then assigned a score from 1 to 7, with 1 being the closest to the ideal 
situation for political rights. 
The Civil Liberties checklist is made up of four categories: Freedom of 
Expression and Belief, Association and Organizational Rights, Rule of Law and Human 
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Rights, and Personal Autonomy and Economic Rights (see Appendix I).  Again, Freedom 
House analyzes the conditions of civil liberties rather than assigning a rating based on the 
existence of legislature guaranteeing those freedoms.  Like the Political Rights dimension 
above, Civil Liberties scores countries on a scale from 1 to 7, with 1 being the most ideal 
freedom.  
The countries analyzed in the Europeanization section have been assigned scores 
based on the Freedom House data.  The data for the EU values were taken by averaging 
the annual ratings for the EU Member States for the years the ratings represent.  For 
example, the ratings for the EU before 2007 do not reflect the scores for Romania and 
Bulgaria.  The ratings for Europe reflect all EU MS and member states of the Council of 
Europe; a total of forty-seven Europe states.      
The data will be compared across a temporal dimension to identify any trend 
away from the ideal Political Rights and Civil Liberties score.  The data will also be 
compared against a European and an EU average to measure national change to broader 
trends and the effectiveness of frontloading; especially in the case of Ukraine.  One of the 
fundamental assumptions herein is that Europeanization begins by developing European 
States that can engage with and be engaged by the mechanisms identified in the previous 
section.  If European States are not characterized by these basic rights and freedoms, then 
they remain outside the further Europeanization process until enough European norms 
and values have been acquired through frontloading.
The European Values Study (EVS) is a longitudinal, cross-national survey of basic 
values in Europe.  “It provides insights into the ideas, beliefs, preferences, attitudes, 
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values and opinions of citizens all over Europe” (EVS, GESIS 2010, p.4).  The EVS 
conducted face-to-face interviews of national residents over 18 years or older to compile 
the results.  The responses to the EVS questions used to identify democracy as a 
normative value and measure how close the selected countries are to that norm.  The 
results are taken from across forty-seven European countries and represent surveys taken 
between 2008 and 2010.  Specifically the dates for the data collection for the case 
countries selected in the next section: Croatia, 31-04-2008 to 31-10-2008; Hungary, 26-
11-2008 to 28-01-2009; Serbia, 14-07-2008 to 31-07-2008; Ukraine, 12-07-2008 to 09-
10-2008 (EVS, GESIS 2010). 
As mentioned in a previous section, EU-ization is primarily concerned with the 
dynamic process occurring between Member States and the EU, and between EU 
Member States.  Furthermore, those mechanisms that can most readily be identified as 
EU-ization are uploading and downloading.  Downloading is the most salient of these 
two processes and is initiated primarily through adoption of the acquis communautaire 
for Candidate States, and the Stabilization and Association Process (SAP), specifically 
for the Potential Candidate States in the Balkans.  Thus the discussion of EU-ization in a 
later section, will focus on the SAP in two Balkan states; Croatia and Serbia.  Croatia and 
Serbia have been selected to emphasize the variance that can occur within regions during 
the EU-ization process.  Moreover, in the analysis of selected case countries, the temporal 
nature of EU-ization is exposed in the case of Serbia.  
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CHAPTER 5
MEASURING EUROPEANIZATION 
The countries in this section were selected specifically to indicate how little 
Europeanization is connected to convergence and how dissimilar the process of 
Europeanization is from EU-ization.  In other words, whereas EU-ization is ostensibly 
focused on the preparation of states to join the EU, the adoption of the acquis 
communautaire and other EU administrative processes, Europeanization reflects a state's 
interaction with a European identity over time.  Therefore, although EU-ization can affect 
states at different rates, states can also experience Europeanization along different levels 
across a European dimension.  Four European countries will be analyzed to reflect this 
diversity:  Serbia and Croatia to identify variance within a region; Hungary and Ukraine 
to highlight any variance across an EU dimension.  The starting assumption of this 
section being that Europeanization is primarily a normative process and can continue to 
affect a state regardless of its position along a EU-ization continuum.  As Ukraine is a 
non-member state, Serbia is a Candidate State, Croatia is set to become a Member State 
in July 2013, and Hungary has been a Member State since 2004, this essay expects an 
array of Europeanization across the selected dimensions.  The assumption being that EU 
MS, CS and PC have closer levels of Europeanization that non-member states.
The first variables to be analyzed are those most often intended to identify EU-
ization, but are more indicative of the basic values of shared among the European 
community: democracy, human rights, and rule of law.  Following along the same line, 
the countries will be analyzed according to the population's perception of the EU.  
Finally, this essay seeks to identify other connections to engagement with the 
development of a European identity.
Democracy, Human Rights, and Rule of Law
Democracy, Human Rights, and Rule of Law in this context are far from simple 
“yes” or “no” answers.  However, in order to identify the process of Europeanization in 
the selected countries, Freedom House data will be used to score and quantify the 
development of these values over time.  Freedom House uses a rating system based on 
political rights and civil liberties, assigning countries scores on a scale of 1 to 7; 1 being 
the most free and 7 being the least.  Furthermore, Freedom House subsumes Human 
Rights and Rule of Law within the civil liberties score.  Therefore, for the purposes of 
measuring Europeanization in this context, Democracy will be measured by a 
combination of political rights and Human Rights and  Rule of Law measured by civil 
liberties.       
The majority of the scores in Table 5.1 are between 1 and 4.   For both political 
rights and civil liberties, 1 is the best score available.  In the political rights category a 1 
is indicative of competitive political parties, inclusion or allowances for minority groups, 
free and fair elections where the elected candidate rules, and freedom for a contributing 
opposition.  A score of 2 indicates the presence of corruption, limitations on opposition 
groups, and outside interference on politics.  Finally, scores from 3 to 5 are indicative of 
the presence of pronounced inequalities in political rights and more prevalence of the 
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corruption, limitations, and negative influences described above.
In terms of civil liberties a rating of 1 is indicative of freedom of expression, 
religion, and assembly, and promote equality.  Countries with a 1 rating also have fair 
rule of law, an independent judiciary, and economic freedoms.  A rating of 2 is again 
indicative of limitations, for example a lack of independent media, trade unions, and 
minority discrimination.  Scores ranging from 3 to 5 are symptomatic of the same flaws, 
but include civil war, military influence, unfair elections, and one-party rule.
The European average for both civil liberties and political rights has held steady at 
2, and likewise the average for the EU has remained steadily at 1 since 2003 (Table 5.1).  
Reliable data for the selected countries provides information for the time frame between 
2006 and 2012; data from Freedom House are retroactive from the previous year.  From 
the data there are two success stories and two clear instances of backsliding.  The 
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Table 5.1: Freedom House Scores - Civil Liberties & Political Rights
Croatia Hungary Serbia Ukraine EU Europe
CL PR CL PF CL PR CL PR CL PR CL PR
1999 4 4 2 1 N/A N/A 4 3 2 1 2 2
2000 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
2001 3 2 2 1 N/A N/A 4 4 2 1 2 2
2002 2 2 2 1 N/A N/A 4 4 2 1 2 2
2003 2 2 2 1 N/A N/A 4 4 1 1 2 2
2004 2 2 2 1 N/A N/A 4 4 1 1 2 2
2005 2 2 1 1 N/A N/A 3 4 1 1 2 2
2006 2 2 1 1 N/A N/A 2 3 1 1 2 2
2007 2 2 1 1 2 3 2 3 1 1 2 2
2008 2 2 1 1 2 3 2 3 1 1 2 2
2009 2 2 1 1 2 3 2 3 1 1 2 2
2010 2 1 1 1 2 2 2 3 1 1 2 2
2011 2 1 1 1 2 2 3 3 1 1 2 2
2012 2 1 2 1 2 2 3 4 1 1 2 2
2013 2 1 2 1 2 2 3 4 1 1 2 2
successful states are Croatia and Serbia, the two Balkan countries.  Both countries have 
evidenced an increase in Human Rights and Rule of Law since 2007.  The traditional 
approach to Europeanization, i.e. EU-ization, would attribute the success directly to the 
EU's involvement in the region.  However, as the previous section outlined, the EU-
ization process is primarily the transfer of rules and laws in the form of the acquis 
communautaire.  Instead, this change can be attributed to Europeanization and the shift 
toward a basic European political structure.  In the case of Croatia factors contributing to 
the shift were improvements concerning minority representation in the parliament, and 
developments in pre-school education, especially for the Roma minority group.  For 
Serbia the positive change is due to the stability of the government over several election 
cycles after Milošević.
On the other hand, Hungary and Ukraine both evidence a decidedly negative shift 
away from a basic European framework.  The change in civil liberties score for Hungary 
comes on the heels of a major shift after the parliamentary elections of 2010.  Fidesz 
gained a two-thirds majority of the National Assembly and thereby the power to amend 
the Hungarian constitution (Bánkuti, Halmai, and Scheppele 2012).  Within the first year, 
the Fidesz parliament entrenched power gains by amending the constitution to allow 
parliament to elect constitutional judges, removed economics from the purview of the 
Constitutional Court and gained control of the Election Commission (Bánkuti, Halmai, 
and Scheppele 2012).  Moreover, the Fidesz government has all but muzzled the domestic 
media with new reforms and has so far been successful in keeping the EU sidelined 
(Jenne and Mudde 2012).  It should be noted that the change in civil liberties puts only 
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Latvia behind Hungary in terms of Big Bang enlargement member states; Latvia scored 2 
for both categories.
Ukraine has evidenced a negative change in both civil liberties and political rights 
since 2011.  Being wholly removed from the EU accession process, Ukraine has yet to 
meet any sort of basic European norm in terms of democracy, human rights, or rule of 
law despite the gains of the Orange Revolution in 2006 (Kubicek 2009).  Moreover, 
Ukraine has consistently scored in the low mid range and decidedly unresponsive to the 
process of Europeanization.  After the Yanukovych government gained power in 2010, 
Ukraine has become oriented toward a pro-Russian stance and Yanukovych has continued 
to implement reforms that are more in line with an authoritarian rule (Menon & Motyl 
2011).  Furthermore, Yanukovych's Party of the Regions has amassed wealth and power 
in Ukraine, stymied economic reform, and allowed corruption to remain entrenched in 
politics and administration (Menon and Motyl 2011).
Contributing to the focus on democracy, data concerning democracy were 
tabulated from the European Value Study (Table 5.2).  Although the data do not show 
change in values across time, they are representative of the national populations of the 
countries selected.  Respondents were asked about levels of satisfaction concerning the 
development of democracy in their country of residence.  Clearly Europeans as a group 
are satisfied with democracy, but with varying levels.  The nuances of the question allow 
for a broad interpretation of the results, and this paper accepts the results as indicative of 
Europeanization having a correlation with democracy.  At over 80 percent, the EU and 
European averages are quite close.  The values position Croatia as closest, of the selected 
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countries, to the European average followed by Hungary, Serbia, and Ukraine 
respectively.           
Furthermore, to elicit data more closely to related to democracy as a European 
norm, data were analyzed according to respondent's reaction to democracy as the best 
form of government (Table 5.3).  Once again the results for an EU and European average 
are close, this time above 90 percent.  Again the results from Croatia are closest, but 
followed in this case by Serbia, then Hungary and finally Ukraine.      
There are a number of underlying factors contributing to the difference in values 
and it is tempting to draw conclusions.  For example, during the time of the survey 
Croatia was invited to begin accession talks and had signed accession protocols with 
NATO, and as will be developed in the next section, deeply entrenched in the EU-ization 
process.  Serbia likewise had moved forward in the EU-ization process and made 
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Table 5.2: Satisfaction With How Democracy is Developing in Country
Croatia Hungary Serbia Ukraine EU Europe
Very Satisfied 1.0 0.8 1.4 2.4 5.4 6.3
Rather Satisfied 24.7 19.8 18.4 14.0 43.7 40.3
Not Very Satisfied 55.5 57.6 56.2 47.6 38.9 39.4
Not Satisfied at All 18.8 21.8 24.0 36.0 12.0 14.0
Table 5.3: Democracy Best Form of Government
Croatia Hungary Serbia Ukraine EU Europe
Strongly Agree 26.5 23.8 31.4 24.8 40.5 40.3
Agree 61.0 57.2 53.1 52.0 51 49.9
Disagree 11.0 17.0 12.8 20.0 7.3 8.3
Strongly Disagree 1.5 2.0 2.7 3.2 1.2 1.5
significant strides in complying with the ICTY.  From this perspective it seems that 
orientation toward the EU could have some affect on satisfaction with democracy.  As 
tempting as that conclusion is however, it does not alone explain Hungarians value 
democracy lower.  As MS Hungary's position behind Croatia in terms of satisfaction with 
democracy could be a based on the break-up of the ruling coalition and cabinet reshuffle 
that took place in the early months of 2008 (BBC 2012).  The international financial 
crisis may also have been a large factor was Hungary became the first MS to turn to the 
IMF and the EU to avoid financial collapse (Hieronymi 2011).  The domestic political 
climate in Ukraine could have also contributed significantly to the low values on 
democracy.  The infighting between President Viktor Yushchenko and Prime Minister 
Yulia Tymoshenko certainly contributed to an already dismal view of democracy in 
Ukraine (Hale 2010).
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CHAPTER 6
ANALYZING EU-IZATION: SAP IN SERBIA AND CROATIA 
In order to utilize the concept of EU-ization as empirical analytical category, it is 
important to identify which measurable variables can be identified.  These variables can 
be attributed to the acquis communautaire, and form the basis of EU-ization in terms of 
CS and PC.  By focusing on the transfers of rules and policies generated within the EU, 
EU-ization can be separated from the normative driven process of Europeanization 
(Flockhart 2010, p.791).  This section details that process in the cases of Serbia and 
Croatia. 
The story of Serbia and Croatia's relationship with the EU begins during the 
conflicts in the former Yugoslavia when the EU was the European Community and the 
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia still existed.  However, in order to analyze EU-ization it 
is best to situate Serbia, Croatia, and the EU post-conflict.  The EU proposed, in 1999, 
the Stabilization and Association Process (SAP) for the Western Balkans.  SAP began as a 
progressive approach to stabilizing the region and eventually led to establishing a free-
trade area.  The year following the start of the project, the European Council announced 
that all SAP countries would be considered potential candidates (PC) for EU 
membership.  
The Zagreb Summit in 2000 recommitted the EU to promoting democracy, rule of 
law, regional reconciliation and cooperation in the Balkans as conditions for possible EU 
accession.  Moreover, the Commission initiated preferential trade agreements with the 
Western Balkan states, and implemented the Community Assistance for Reconstruction, 
Development and Stabilization (CARDS) program (European Commission 2012).  This 
approach was a means for the EU to implement policy change and to promote rule 
adoption from the top down; i.e. downloading.
The CARDS program supported SAP and reinforced the EU's democratic, human 
rights, rule of law, minority protection, and other conditional reforms.  Subotic (2010) 
likewise identified a similar process in issue linkage, but placed a caveat on the success 
of such a strategy: 
Issue linkage is a powerful tool for policy change, but it can produce the opposite 
effect from the one intended if it is not followed by a comprehensive package of 
broader social transformation and not mechanistic compliance that ends up being 
not much more than policy lip service (p. 612).   
 Following the Thessaloniki European Council in June 2003, Serbia and Croatia 
were both potential candidate states for EU accession; Croatia having signed a 
Stabilization and Association Agreement (SAA) in 2001 and Serbia still waiting to 
complete ratification of an SAA to officially start the SAP.
However, the EU-ization process for Croatia and Serbia would proceed at a 
markedly different pace for each country.  By 2006, the EU Commission had already 
approved Croatia's membership application, two years earlier in 2004, Croatia's SAA had 
entered into force and the first chapter of EU accession negotiations were opened.  By 
contrast, on May 3, 2006 Serbia's SAA negotiations were called off due to 
noncooperation with the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia 
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(ICTY) (European Commission 2012).  
“Cooperation by Serbia...was not complete, consistent or expeditious...no progress 
was made on...the remaining fugitives, all of whom have connections to Serbia 
[d]espite... promises and deadlines passed [and the] independence of 
Montenegro...did not have... negative impact on cooperation... [t]he Office of the 
Prosecutor continued to have direct... positive cooperation with the Government 
of Montenegro” (United Nations 2006, 20).
Subotic (2010) attributes this stalling in EU-ization to the two-level gaming of 
local political elites and identifies it as an impetus for Serbian leadership change.  
Although the negotiations had slowed in 2005 due to Serbia's decreased cooperation with 
the ICTY, the EU resumed the process a short time later; thereby initiating EU-ization 
through downloading.  The fact that the negotiations stalled again just another year later 
was enough for Serbia to be locked in a “trap of the unfinished past” with the Hague, and 
for the EU to stop further assistance until Serbians could become more Europeanized.  
While EU-ization stalled in Serbia, between 2005 and 2007, Croatia was fully 
entrenched in EU-ization.  During this time span, Croatia had arrested their last 
remaining war criminal for the ICTY, reloaded European norms and values, and began 
preparing to download preparations for the acquis communautaire (Subotic 2011).  In 
fact, by 2006 the screening process for accession negotiations had finished and the first 
chapter of the acquis communautaire was opened and provisionally closed.  Croatia, it 
seems was the model state for the successful Europeanization and EU-ization.  “All major 
political stakeholders saw Croatia's future in Europe, and they were all willing to 
manipulate the domestic political environment in order to achieve this goal” (Subotic 
2011, p.320).
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Croatia was able to maintain such a successively smooth path through EU-ization 
largely in part due to the death of the then President Franjo Tudjman in 1999, and the 
subsequent defeat of the ruling Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ) in the 2000 elections.  
Under Tudjman and his dominant HDZ, Croatia had been exemplifying characteristics of 
authoritarianism and non-liberal tendencies.  After the elections in 2000, control of the 
parliament shifted from one dominant party, HDZ, to a leading coalition between the 
Social Democratic Party (SDP) and Croatian Social Liberal Party (HSLS).  The change in 
leadership of the Croatian parliament would last only one election cycle, but the HDZ's 
defeat at the hands of the SDP-HSLS coalition generated support for European 
integration, signaled an intolerance for corruption, and an impetus within the HDZ to 
revitalize their platform (Fink-Hafner 2007).
Leveraging public support for the so-called “Homeland War”, the Tudjman 
government's narrative for the conflicts that took place in Croatia in the 1990's, the HDZ 
garnered enough votes to retake the Croatian parliament in 2003 with 43.4 per cent of the 
vote (Jović 2009).  Although this support was generated by a rhetoric against ICTY 
cooperation, the new HDZ-led government under Ivo Sanader repositioned itself as pro-
EU and began to comply with the ICTY.  Perhaps most tellingly, General Mirko Norac, 
who Sanader had called a hero in 2000, was sentenced to prison in Croatia and indicted 
by the ICTY in 2003 (Jović 2009).
In Serbia, Prime Minister and President of the Democratic Party of Serbia (DSS), 
Vojislav Koštunica was involved in SAA negotiations, but was even more responsible for 
those negotiations being suspended (Orlovic 2007).  Koštunica had relied on the principle 
30
of “voluntary surrender” on the part of ICTY indictees, and his nationalist government 
had made no moves to arrest Ratko Mladic and Radovan Karadžic, both of whom were 
wanted by The Hague (Orlovic 2007).  As a result of the stalled SAA negotiations, the 
party dynamics inside of Serbia began to shift.
This shift can be attributed to frontloading as Serbia began to reflect more of a 
European identity and accept an accountability to the ICTY.  The shift in party dynamics 
was toward European parties and federations or, Europarties.  The Democratic Party 
(DS), not to be confused with  Koštunica's DSS, was admitted to the Party of European 
Socialists (PES), a social-democratic, socialist, and laborist federation of EU parties 
(Orlovic 2007).  Likewise the DSS and G17+ became associate members of the European 
People's Party (EPP), a conservative, Christian-democratic and people's EU party 
federation (Orlovic 2007).  This shift allowed the parties to gain European legitimacy, 
increased lobbying power with the EU, and indicated the growth of pro-EU sentiment on 
the part of the Serbian people and leaders.  The Europarties thus facilitated frontloading 
in Serbia.  In other words, where Serbia's government before 2007 was highly nationalist 
and anti-European; after negotiations stalled with the EU SAA, the elections showed a 
shift toward a pro-EU alignment.
After the 2007 elections the government was split between a pro-EU coalition 
consisting of the DS, G17+, and the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), and the nationalist 
coalition with the DSS, SPS, and SRS (International Crisis Group 2007, p.2).  The pro-
EU coalition took 37.6 per cent of seats in parliament and the anti-European coalition 
took 58 per cent (International Crisis Group 2007, p.2-3).  In an effort to support the 
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growing pro-EU sentiment in Serbia, the EU restarted SAA negotiations on June 13, 2007 
(European Commission 2012) . Later in November 2007 the SAA with Serbia was 
officially initiated along with the implementation of the Visa Facilitation and 
Readmission Agreement which allowed the simplification of the visa application process, 
especially for business purposes.
 On April 29, 2008 the EU and Serbia signed the SAA and the Interim Agreement 
on Trade and Trade-related issues in Luxembourg, and the agreement was then ratified by 
the National Assembly of Serbia on September 9 (European Commission 2012).  The 
decision came after the ICTY Chief Prosecutor, Serge Brammertz, reported positively on 
Serbia's cooperation with the ICTY (Europa 2013).  Moreover, on December 19, 2009 the 
EU implemented visa liberalization for Serbian's traveling in the Schengen area, a 
significant step to increase EU-ization which was reflected by Serbia officially submitting 
its application for EU membership on December 22, 2009. 
The ratification process for the SAA solidified Serbia's entrance into EU-ization 
as ratification was required by each member state and by the EU.  The ratifications began 
in June 2010 and on January 19, 2011 the European Parliament voted to ratify the EU-
Serbia Stabilization and Association Agreement (European Parliament 2011, 13).  As part 
of the condition for continuation on the path to potential EU candidacy, the European 
Parliament required Serbia to continue cooperating with the ICTY, to work toward a 
resolution with Kosovo, and to ensure Serbians do not misuse free travel through 
Schengen (European Parliament 2011, 13). 
Croatia, on the other hand, remained locked in the EU-ization process.  Moreover, 
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Croatia closed the final chapters of the acquis communautaire, signed an accession treaty 
with the EU and on 1 July 2013 will become the 29th EU Member State.  Serbia is still far 
behind Croatia in terms of EU-ization, but as a confirmed EU Candidate State Serbia is 
highly Europeanized, and poised to remain so.  The EU-ization of these two countries 
affirms the assumptions, set in the paper earlier, that the process is separate from 
Europeanization and can be studied as such.  Clearly EU-ization was most pronounced in 
Croatia.  Serbia has continued through EU-ization at a much slower pace so there is a 
level of diversity in this bounded process. 
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CHAPTER 6
CONCLUSION
The research here shows that there may be more quantifiable and empirical 
methods of identifying and measuring Europeanization when Europeanization is 
distinguished from EU-ization.  For example quantifying the adoption of the acquis 
communautaire of time and analysis of EU rule adoption post-accession for studies of 
EU-ization.  Likewise, more longitudinal studies concerning variables connected to a 
European identity and European norms like minority rights, gender equality, and 
environmental policy can bolster research in Europeanization.  Democracy, Human 
Rights, and Rule of Law serve well as baseline variables for Europeanization in this 
study, but should be quantified across Europe over time.  In this way states can be 
measured in distinct categories of Europeanization.   
By identifying the separate processes at work on CS, PC, and non-member states 
researchers can gauge the implications of larger European trends separate from the 
European integration project that characterizes EU-ization.  This essay argues that the 
two processes do work separately and with differing dynamics.  EU-ization is bounded by 
the EU and seems more active during the accession process.  Europeanization is not 
bound by such temporal restraints and constantly affects the norms, values, and belief 
systems of European states despite any orientation toward the EU.
EU-ization seems to be fundamentally a process of EU rule transfer to CS, PC, 
non-member states.  As evidenced by both Croatia and Serbia, EU-ization occurs mostly 
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through downloading.  From the discussion in terms of the ICTY , EU-ization may have 
slowed or stalled in Serbia, but like in Croatia the process continued despite rhetoric 
otherwise.  Data concerning administrative and bureaucratic processes between the EU 
and actors in Croatia and Serbia during the slowdowns in SAA negotiations could 
provide more insight into the pace of downloading and evidence for crossloading.
Hungary was decidedly absent from discussions on EU-ization and further 
research into uploading and crossloading could include Hungary.  Clearly if downloading 
is concerned primarily with the process of EU accession it has little affect on Hungary.  
However, as evidenced by the survey results discussed above, it is unclear which 
mechanisms are at work in Hungary.  The case is the same for Ukraine and more detailed 
research into crossloading and reloading could provide insight as to how these 
mechanisms change over time and MS and non-member countries influence and are 
influenced by Europeanization.  
Furthermore research agendas constructed around candidate states, potential 
candidate states, and non-member states have an ability to contribute the growing study 
of Europeanization.  Moreover, more longitudinal studies of  CS, PC, and non-member 
states can solidify the existence and support the capacity of the mechanisms described 
above to measure the distinct concepts of Europeanization and EU-ization.
Because of the confines of this analysis, further research undertaken utilizing 
detailed rhetorical analysis and thorough discourse analysis would elucidate this 
phenomenon further and serve to pluck Europeanization from the divisive nature of 
European Integration Theory.  Moreover, a thorough redefinition of Europeanization can 
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provide researchers with a clearer understanding of the modeling needed and the 
processes to identify.  Because of the ebb and flow of Europeanization literature to date, 
this essay recommends a in-depth analysis of the Europeanization literature over time that 
can more aptly explain the emergence of EU-ization as a subset of Europeanization.  
Such a detailed review of the literature cold serve to establish a new area of research that 
is far less EU-centric.  
Perhaps there is room for this discussion in the “widening” and “deepening” 
literature concerning the EU.  Europeanization could also be used to explain the 
formation of different political systems in European states outside of the EU, and to 
compare European political organizations to other international or supranational systems.  
What this essay does hope to do however is to strictly separate Europeanization and EU-
ization and place the latter as a phenomenon that occurs within a certain time and place of 
the former.  Furthermore it is important to note that Europeanization could benefit from a 
Foucauldian genealogy approach.  Such a thorough examination may prove the 
underlying assumptions of this essay to be presupposing or tautological.
Finally, Europeanization and EU-ization have been reviewed in the context of 
select states.  The dearth of material available concerning the variables this essay seeks to 
analyze leaves further research to be completed.  Further research into the mechanisms 
described could help to generate more accurate models that included interactions between 
Europeanization and EU-ization.  This essay holds that the distinction between the 
processes of Europeanization and EU-ization is necessary.  Furthermore, this essay posits 
that EU-ization has occurred along a specific path for Serbia and Croatia, and that 
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Europeanization continues to occur outside of the EU.  However, it is clear that 
identifying the mechanisms of Europeanization remain far more difficult than pointing to 
the instances of EU-ization through the EU's most recent series of enlargements.
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Appendix I:
Freedom House Basic Checklist Questions
Political Rights Checklist
A. Electoral Process
1.  Is the head of the government or other chief national authority elected through 
free and fair elections?
2.  Are the national legislative representatives elected through free and fair elections?
3.  Are the electoral laws and framework fair?
B.  Political Pluralism and Participation
1.  Do the people have the right to organize in different political parties or other 
competitive political groupings of their choice, and is the system open to the rise 
and fall of these competing parties or groupings? 
2. Is there a significant opposition vote and a realistic possibility for the opposition 
to increase its support or gain power through elections?
3. Are the people's political choices free from domination by the military, foreign 
powers, totalitarian parties, religious hierarchies, economic oligarchies, or any 
other powerful group?
4. Do cultural, religious, or other minority groups have full political rights and 
electoral opportunities?
C.  Functioning of Government
1. Do the freely elected head of government and national legislative representatives 
determine the policies of the government?
2. Is the government free from pervasive corruption?
3. Is the government accountable to the electorate between elections, and does it 
operate with openness and transparency?
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Additional Discretionary Political Rights Questions
A. For traditional monarchies that have no parties or electoral process, does the 
system provide for genuine, meaningful consultation with the people, encourage public 
discussion of policy choices, and allow the right to petition the ruler?
B. Is the government or occupying power deliberately changing the ethnic 
composition of a country or territory so as to destroy a culture or tip the political balance 
in favor of another group?
Civil Liberties Checklist
D.  Freedom of Expression and Belief
1. Are there free and independent media and other forms of cultural expression? 
(Note: In cases where the media are state controlled but offer pluralistic points of 
view, the survey gives the system credit.)
2. Are religious institutions and communities free to practice their faith and express 
themselves in public and private?
3. Is there academic freedom, and is the educational system free of extensive 
political indoctrination?
4. Is there open and free private discussion?
E.  Associational and Organizational Rights
1. Is there freedom of assembly, demonstration, and open public discussion?
2. Is there freedom for nongovernmental organizations? (Note: This includes civic 
organizations, interest groups, foundations, etc.)
3. Are there free trade unions and peasant organizations or equivalents, and is there 
effective collective bargaining?  Are there free professional and other private 
organizations?
F.  Rule of Law
1. Is there an independent judiciary?
2. Does the rule of law prevail in civil and criminal matters?  Are police under direct 
civilian control?
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3. Is there protection from political terror, unjustified imprisonment, exile, or torture, 
whether by groups that support or oppose the system?  Is there freedom from war 
and insurgencies?
4. Do laws, policies, and practices guarantee equal treatment of various segments of 
the population?
G.  Personal Autonomy and Individual Rights
1. Do citizens enjoy freedom of travel or choice of residence, employment, or 
institution of higher education?
2. Do citizens have the right to own property and establish private businesses?  Is 
private business activity unduly influenced by government officials, the security 
forces, political parties/organizations, or organized crime?
3. Are there personal social freedoms, including gender equality, choice of marriage 
partners, and size of family?
4. Is there equality of opportunity and the absence of economic exploitation?
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Appendix II:
Croatia and Serbia Consolidated EU-ization Timeline
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1999
2000 Nov
2001 First year of the new CARDS program specifically designed for the SAP countries.
2001 Jun
2001 Oct 29
2003 Feb 21
2003 Jun
2004 Apr
2004 Jun European Council confirms Croatia as EU candidate country
2004 Oct Council conclusions open up a process for SAA with Serbia
2004 Dec 20
2005 Feb 1 Croatia SAA comes into force
2005 Mar 16
2005 Apr 26
2005 Oct 3
2005 Oct 10 EU begins negotiations for a Stabilization and Association Agreement with Serbia
2005 Oct 20
2006 May 3
2006 May 21 Montenegro declares independence
2006 Jun 15 Serbia officially recognizes Montenegro as an independent state
2006 Oct Croatia finalizes screening process
2007 Jun 13
2007 Nov 1 SAA with Serbia officially initiated
The EU proposes the new Stabilization and Association Process (SAP) for five countries 
of South-Eastern Europe
Zagreb Summit launches the Stabilization and Association Process
Feira European Council states that all the SAP countries are “potential candidates” for 
EU membership.
Stabilization and Association Agreement Signed with Croatia
Croatia applies for EU membership
Thessaloniki Summit, SAP confirmed as EU policy for the Western Balkans and EU 
accession
European Commission issues positive opinion on Croatia’s application for EU 
membership
European Council sets official date, 17 March 2005, to begin accession negotiations with 
Croatia, provided full cooperation with the ICTY
EU postpones start of accession negotiations with Croatia due to failure to capture Ante 
Gotovina and send to the ICTY;instead adopts a framework for further negotiations 
First meeting of Stabilization and Association Council; meeting of extended “EU troika” 
on Croatia’s cooperation with the ICTY
ICTY Chief Prosecutor, Carla del Ponte assesses Croatia as fully cooperating with the 
ICTY. Council begins accession negotiations the same day
Beginning of the screening process, analytical overview and review of the degree of 
harmonization of Croatian legislation with the acquis communautaire
Serbia SAA negotiations called off due to lack of progress on co-operation with the 
ICTY
SAA negotiations with Serbia resumed after proving a commitment to full cooperation 
with the ICTY
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2008 Jan 1
2008 Feb 12
2008 Feb 17 Assembly of Kosovo declares independence
2008 Apr 29 SAA and Interim Agreement with Serbia signed
2008 Jul 21
2008 Sep 9 SAA and Interim Agreement ratified by National Assembly of Serbia
2008 Sep 15 Netherlands freezes SAA and trade part of SAA
2008 Oct 30
2009 Jan 1 Serbia implements Interim Trade Agreement with EU
2009 Oct 2 5 chapters provisionally closed for Croatia
2009 Nov 27 3 chapters provisionally closed for Croatia
2009 Dec 7 European Commission implements Interim Trade agreement with Serbia
2009 Dec 19 Visa-free regime for Serbia enters into Force
2009 Dec 21 2 chapters provisionally closed for Croatia
2009 Dec 22 Serbia officially applies for EU membership
2010 Feb 1 Interim agreement with Serbia enters into force
2010 Feb 19 2 chapters opened for Croatia
2010 Apr 19 1 chapter provisionally closed for Croatia
2010 Jun 14 European Commission starts ratification of Serbia SAA
2010 Jun 21 Spain ratifies Serbia's SAA
2010 Jun 30 Final 3 chapters opened for Croatia and 2 chapters closed
2010 Jul 6 Malta ratifies Serbia's SAA
2010 Jul 27 2 chapters provisionally closed for Croatia
2010 Aug 12 Bulgaria ratifies Serbia's SAA
2010 Aug 19 Estonia ratifies Serbia's SAA
2010 Oct 25
2010 Nov 5 3 chapters provisionally closed for Croatia
2010 Nov 11 Slovakia ratifies Serbia's SAA
2010 Nov 16 Hungary ratifies Serbia's SAA
2010 Nov 26 Cyprus ratifies Serbia's SAA
2010 Dec 7 Slovenia ratifies Serbia's SAA
2010 Dec 8 Czech Republic ratifies Serbia's SAA
2010 Dec 22 3 chapters provisionally closed for Croatia
2011 Jan 6 Italy ratifies Serbia's SAA
2011 Jan 13 Austria ratifies Serbia's SAA
2011 Jan 19 European Parliament ratifies Serbia's SAA
2011 Jan 21 Luxembourg ratifies Serbia's SAA
Entry into force of the Visa Facilitation and Readmission Agreement between Serbia and 
the EU
The European Council adopts new Accession Partnership with Croatia
Arrest of war crime indictee Radovan Karadžic 
The meeting of the Accession Conference for Croatia; 4 negotiation chapters 
provisionally closed
European Council forwards Serbia's membership application to the European 
Commission
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2011 Jan 26 Greece ratifies Serbia's SAA
2011 Feb 10 Germany ratifies Serbia's SAA
2011 Apr 19 2 chapters closed for Croatia
2011 May 26
2011 Jun 6 1 chapter provisionally closed for Croatia
2011 Jun 30 Final 4 chapters closed for Croatia
2011 Jul 20
2011 Oct 12
2011 Oct 26 Finland ratifies Serbia's SAA
2011 Nov 24 France ratifies Serbia's SAA
2011 Dec 1 European Parliament approves EU accession for Croatia
2011 Dec 25 European Council approves EU accession for Croatia
2011 Dec 9
2012 Jan 22 Referendum on Croatian EU membership: 66.27% of voters said YES for the EU
2012 Feb 1 Slovakia ratifies Croatia´s Accession Treaty
2012 Feb 13 Hungary ratifies Croatia´s Accession Treaty
2012 Feb 15 Italy ratifies Croatia´s Accession Treaty
2012 Feb 17 Bulgaria ratifies Croatia´s Accession Treaty
2012 Feb 28 General Affairs Council recommends granting Serbia candidate status
2012 Mar 1 The European Council grants Serbia candidate status
2012 Mar 5 Malta ratifies Croatia´s Accession Treaty
2012 Mar 9 Croatia ratifies Croatia's Accession Treaty
2012 Mar 22 Latvia ratifies the Treaty of Croatia's Accession to the EU
2012 Apr 19 Romania ratifies Serbia's SAA
2012 Apr 25 Czech Republic ratifies Croatia's Accession Treaty
2012 Apr 26 Lithuania ratifies Croatia's Accession Treaty
2012 May 3 Cyprus ratifies Croatia’s Accession Treaty
2012 Jun 19
2012 Jun 26 Romania ratifies Croatia's Accession Treaty
2012 Jul 4 Austria ratifies Croatia's Accession Treaty
2012 Sep 12 Estonia ratifies Croatia´s Accession Treaty
2012 Sep 14 Poland ratifies Croatia´s Accession Treaty
2012 Sep 21 Portugal ratifies Croatia's Accession Treaty
2012 Oct 9 Luxembourg ratifies Croatia´s Accession Treaty
2012 Oct 11 Spain ratifies Croatia´s Accession Treaty
2012 Oct 31 Greece ratifies Croatia´s Accession Treaty
2012 Nov 7 Sweden ratifies Croatia´s Accession Treaty
2012 Dec 18 Finland ratifies Croatia´s Accession Treaty
2013 Jan 15 French Senate Ratifies Croatia's Accession Treaty
2013 Jan 21 UK ratifies Croatia's Accession Treaty
2013 Jan 24 Belgium ratifies Croatia's Accession Treaty
2013 Mar 2 Netherlands ratifies Croatia's Accession Treaty
Former Bosnian Serb military commander Ratko Mladić arrested and later extradited to 
the Hague
Final war crimes fugitive, Goran Hadžić, arrested
European Commission recommend Serbia to become a candidate country for European 
Union membership and to recommend that the country will be ready to start accession 
negotiations as soon as further good progress is made in one key area
Croatia signs Accession Treaty with the European Union and the European Council 
postpones Serbia's candidate status to March 2012
Ireland ratifies Croatia´s Accession Treaty
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